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THE PER SE ILLEGALITY OF PRICE-FXING--SANS
POWER, PURPOSE, OR EFFECT
In Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,' the Supreme Court held illegal
per se a maximum resale price-fixing agreement between producers (a parent
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary), thereby filling some of the few re-
maining gaps in the law against price-fixing agreements. Although a broad dic-
tum in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. states that under the Sherman
Act2 "a combination formed for the purpose of and with the effect of raising, de-
pressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or
foreign commerce is illegal per se,"3 no antitrust precedent had directly deter-
mined that sellers attempting to hold down the resale prices of their products
were restraining trade.4 The Miller-Tydings Amendment 5 does not exempt
maximum resale price-fixing; but under a test of "reasonableness" the arrange-
ments in the instant case might have been upheld as a weapon against monopo-
listic combinations of distributors. The rule against price-fixing, however, ap-
pears to have become too stringent to admit promotion of competition as an ef-
fective justification.6 Without proof of market power or effect and solely on the
basis of a jury finding of conspiracy between the defendants to fix maximum re-
sale prices on their products, the Court held their action violative of Section 1
of the Sherman Act. Based upon probably the first set of facts to require a
square holding by the Supreme Court that price-fixing agreements are literally
illegal per se, this decision deserves further scrutiny as a precedent which prom-
ises to play a significant role in future antitrust prosecutions. 7
1340 U.S. 211 (1951). 2 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1951).
3310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
4 Sellers' maximum price-fixing must, of course, be distinguished from the monopsonistic
practices of buyers who compel sale to themselves at prices lower than those which the seller
would obtain under competitive conditions. The latter, more clearly apposite to sellers' mini-
mum price-fixing, was declared illegal within the per se rule in Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v.
American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948), and may have been the type of price de-
pression envisoned by Justice Douglas when the Socony-Vacuum opinion was written.
650 Stat. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1951). This amendment exempts only
"contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for resale" under specified conditions.
6 Kiefer-Stewart implicitly rejects a dictum in Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408, 412
(Conn., 1950), to the effect that plaintiff-retailers' illegal price maintenance agreement was a
defense to their suit for treble damages under the antitrust laws.
7The Court of Appeals opinion in favor of the distillers contains a fairly comprehensive
exposition of the facts. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 182 F. 2d 228, 229-34
(C.A. 7th, 1950).
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I
Shortly after termination of OPA ceilings in October 1946 and following a
meeting of the Indiana Wholesale Liquor Dealers Association,8 Kiefer-Stewart
and every other liquor wholesaler in Indiana filed identical schedules of in-
creased prices with state authorities. The new schedules were arrived at by com-
puting the customary fifteen per cent wholesaler's mark-up on the basis of costs
plus taxes, whereas OPA regulations had required the computation to be made
exclusive of taxes added during the period of OPA control. Subsequently (No-
vember 6, 1946), Seagram, which had spent some $500,000 advertising against
inflated whisky prices,9 notified Indiana wholesalers that wholesale prices were
to be kept at OPA levels. Upon the wholesalers' concerted refusal to comply,
Seagram suspended all shipments to Indiana distributors."0 Immediately prior
to this action Kiefer-Stewart and Calvert Distilling Company, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Seagram," had concluded negotiations giving Kiefer-Stewart a
Calvert distributorship; and even after Seagram had severed relations, Calvert
representatives had assured Kiefer-Stewart that their relationship would be un-
affected by the parent company's defection and that cases of liquor would be de-
livered as promised. Within a week the deal was called off, and the jury found
that Calvert's reversal of position was the result of an agreement with Seagram
and not independent action." By February of the next year all Indiana whole-
salers except Kiefer-Stewart had filed notification of a return to the OPA meth-
od of calculating mark-ups and by July 1, 1947, had entered into fair trade con-
tracts with both distillers which stipulated similar minimum wholesale prices.1
4
8 This group has a membership fluctuating between twenty-seven and thirty members
representing all the whisky wholesalers operating in Indiana. See Transcript of Record at 155,
ibid.
9 Competition: Liquor Price Key, Business Week, at 50 (Nov. 16, 1946), which also reported
that "[wihile Seagram held its trio of Scotches at the old OPA ceilings, recorded increases
marked on by other importers ranged anywhere from nearly $5 to more than $29 a case at
wholesale." Ibid., at 54.
10 It is doubtful that many Seagram sales were lost during the siege since liquor retailers
and wholesalers generally carry large inventories even of fast-moving brands.
1 Distillers Corporation-Seagrams, Ltd., a Canadian corporation not a party to this liti-
gation, wholly owns Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., an Indiana corporation which is both an
operating and holding company and, in the latter capacity, wholly owns Calvert Distilling
Company, a Maryland corporation. Calvert common stock, originally held by the Canadian
corporation was transferred to the Indiana company on April 9, 1945, and in the trial stage
the wholesaler claimed this acquisition was unlawful but dropped the charge on appeal. 182 F.
2d 228, 229 (C.A. 7th, 1950).
2 Transcript of Record at 82, ibid.
13 Reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient
evidence to warrant the jury finding.
14 Despite allegations in the Kiefer-Stewart briefs, these contracts were a logical extension
of the original policy since competition for retail business is sufficiently strong among Indiana
wholesalers to make minimum prices maximum prices. Besides, a regulation of the Indiana
Alcoholic Beverage Commission, effective July 1, 1947, made fair trade contracts a prerequisite
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An adequate understanding of factors motivating the parties litigant may be
had only by going behind the record to the power relationships and the business
context in which they functioned. Since repeal of prohibition four major con-
cerns have, as a group, consistently controlled two-thirds of the whisky business
and a similar proportion of the all-important inventories of aging whiskies.15
Generally there is no price competition among the Big Four who confine their
conflict to marketing techniques and the battle of brands. 16 Although the indus-
try itself attributes high-level price rigidity to its relatively fixed number of
consumers," its social conscience, 8 and the danger of losing prestige and volume
to "price and brand" advertising by distillers. Brief for Respondents in the Supreme Court
24 n.11 and Transcript of Record at 215, Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340
U.S. 211 (1951).
15 "The competitive pattern was set long before the war by the four major distillers-
Schenley Distillers Corp., and Distillers Corp.-Seagrams, Ltd., National Distillers Products
Corp., and Hiram Walker-Gooderham & Worts, Ltd.-which have dominated the industry
for the last ten years. Known to retailers as 'the Axis,' these four now hold more than 70% of
the U.S. whiskey supply." The Whiskey Rebellion, 35 Fortune, No. 6, at 141 (June 1947). "[I]n
the brief fifteen years of the industry's existence since repeal, the intensity of brand competi-
tion has resulted in a measure of concentration familiar in many American industries.... Five
leading brands, which before the war did 20 per cent of the total U.S. business now do 50 per
cent of the business. The Big Four distillers now get about 75 per cent of the business, make
about half the whiskey, and hold about 60 per cent of the inventories." Seagram In the Chips,
38 Fortune, No. 3, at 97 (Sept. 1948). For similar statistics consult: Corrado, Distillers Pre:
pare for Bigger Sales, 25 Barron's, at 13 (Nov. 26, 1945); 6 Hearings before the Temporary
National Economic Committee, Pub. Res. 113, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. 2435-40, Exhibits 399-402
at 2678-81 (1939); Dobbs, Liquors Facing Price War?, 84 Magazine of WallStreet at 283 (June
18, 1949).
16 TNEC Hearings, op. cit. supra note 15, at 2562-68, 2519 (testimony of W. W. Wachtel,
president of Calvert Distilling and of James Friel, vice-president of Distillers Corp.-Sea-
grams, Ltd.). "Most price-slashing was done at the retail level, and it was usually the retailers'
profit margins that were affected.... [Clompetition has largely been removed from the price
arena and concentrated in such intangibles as flavor and quality." Bleiberg, Distillers See
Long Life for Fair Trade, 28 Barron's at 10 (Nov. 8, 1948).
17 Seagram in the Chips, 38 Fortune, No. 3, at 97 (Sept. 1948). Although it may be true that
the whisky market is relatively inelastic, apparent consumption has varied greatly over the
years. Since repeal of prohibition consumption on a per capita basis has fluctuated from a low
of .93 wine-gallons of distilled spirits in 1939 to 1.39 wine-gallons in 1946 back to 1.02 in 1949.
Statistical Abstract of U.S 787 (1950). Total consumption was 89,676,000wine-gallons in 1935;
144,996,000 in 1940; 190,148,000 in 1942; 145,524,000 in 1943; 230,976,000 in 1946; 171,012,000
in 1948; 190,343,000 in 1950. Computed from Dep't of Commerce, 1949 Statistic Supplement-
Survey of Current Business 134 (1949); and Dep't of Commerce, Survey of Current Business
S-27 (June 1951).
18Persons at every level of the industry disclaim any intention of bringing new consumers
into the market; even advertising seems intended for those who have already imbibed-no one
gets that "first exhilarating feeling," one merely "switches" to Calvert. Undoubtedly a fear of
"dry" legislation underlies this approach; and for the same reason temperance seems also to
be a main theme. "The per capita consumption of liquor willvary somewhat with the national
income, but the industry chooses discreetly to do little or nothing to increase this consumption.
... In fact it preaches moderation. The main struggle therefore is among its members for the
available business.... Thus distillers meet each other warily within the cage of relatively
fixed consumption." Ibid. See also Seagram Bars Cut in Domestic Prices, N.Y. Times § 1,
p. 37, col. 3 (July 20, 1949); and Abrahamson, Whiskey-The Incidence of Public Tolerance
in Price Policy in Hamilton, Price and Price Policies 395, 407-8 (1938).
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from reduced or fluctuating prices,19 "stickiness" and nonprice competition are
probably the familiar results of market domination by a few firms.20
After tasting the bitter dregs of price wars in the middle Thirties, retailers
and wholesalers, who had absorbed a major portion of the losses, 21 began to reap
some of the advantages of combination under the fair trade laws. When whisky-
makers, seeking greater volume, showed reluctance to enforce price mainte-
nance,2 some state legislatures made fair trade mandatory for the industry.23
19 Mr. Gene Tunney, chairman of the board, American Distilling Co., explained that dis-
tillers supported fair trade because "it ruins the reputation of an article if it gets into constant
war over price.... I don't think it does anybody's product any good to get in price wars, in
the public mind." TNEC hearings, op. cit. supra note 15, at 2571. Similar statements were
made by representatives of Schenley Distilling Corp. and National Distillers Corp. in personal
interviews. It is quite possible, of course, that volume is lost because influential retailers refuse
to push price-cut brands.
20 "The prices of all domestic products of Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., will remain un-
changed for the balance of the year, Pen. Frank R. Schwengel, company president declared
today.... HXe emphasized the 'firm price' policy is not a new one with the company, point-
ing out that domestic brands have not changed in price since 1936. The higher price per
bottle to the consumer is due entirely to tax increases which now constitute more than 50 per
cent of the retail price of liquor, he said." Seagram Bars Cut in Domestic Prices, N.Y. Times
§ 1, p. 37, col. 3 (July 20, 1949).
"The outstanding virtue of a system of private enterprise, therefore, arises out of a kind of
mutual confidence game. But if there are few enough sellers in the market to enable each to
watch all the others, the play may slow down: if a price cut will be quickly met, and-no lasting
benefit secured, why make it at all? To the extent that the sellers anticipate each others'
reactions and become of one mind, they behave like one seller, a monopolist." Adelman,
Effective Competition and Antitrust Laws, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1289, 1299 (1948). Without
adopting this author's causal analysis, it is not difficult to ascertain numerous ways in which
knowledge of competing prices is available to members of the liquor industry-filing require-
ments with state beverage commissions and "fair trade" itself provide excellent methods of
"signal-calling" without the appearance of collusion. See Irvin, Distilled Spirits, pt. IV, p. 9
(Foote, Cone & Belding Res. Dep't 1948); Trade Association Statistics and the Anti-Trust
Laws, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 380 (1951); see note 153 infra.
21Bleiberg, Distillers See Long Life for Fair Trade, 28 Barron's at 10 (Nov. 8, 1948);
FTC, Report on Resale Price Maintenance, c. VIII (1945).
n2 Although lack of diligence in prosecuting violators has ordinarily been held to be no
defense to prosecution for violation of fair trade laws, National Distillers Products Corp. v.
Columbus Circle Liquor Stores, 166 N.Y. Misc. 719, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 319 (S.Ct., 1938), Calvert
Distilling Co. v. Gold's Drug Stores, 123 N.J. Eq. 458, 198 Atl. 536 (1938), Calvert Distillers
Corp. v. Stockman, 26 F. Supp. 73 (E.D.N.Y., 1939), nevertheless the cases are instructive as
to distillers' general attitudes toward fair trade laws. Cases in which actual abandonment of
price maintenance and encouragement of price-cutting by a distiller have been successfully
employed as a defense to discriminatory fair trade enforcement by that same distiller are
numerous. Wilson Distilling Co. v. Stockman, 11 N.Y.S. 2d 51 (S.Ct., 1939); and cases cited
and analyzed in American Fair Trade Council, Resale Price Maintenance 25 (1942). See also
FTC, Report on Resale Price Maintenance, c. VIII, at 358, 364-67, 396 (1945); The Whiskey
Rebellion, 35 Fortune, No. 6, at 143 (June 1947).
23 2 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 7375 (1945) lists New Jersey, Arizona, California, Illinois,
Kentucky, New Mexico, and New York as states with mandatory fair trade laws applicable to
the liquor industry. The Illinois and New York mandatory liquor fair trade laws were recently
declared unconstitutional on technical grounds. Illinois Liquor Control Commission v. Chi-
cago's Last Liquor Store, 403 Ill. 578, 88 N.E. 2d 15 (1947); Levine v. O'Connell, 275 App.
Div. 217, 88 N.Y.S. 2d 672 (1949) (N.Y. Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 17(12)) (Supp.,
1949). For an account of other legislative aids to retail monopolies, see Sales Below Cost Pro-
hibitions: Private Price Fixing under State Law, 57 Yale L.J. 391 (1948).
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But, even when the state did not step in, distillers soon learned that such re-
luctance could be costly. Being dependent upon consumer appeal based on non-
price distinctions such as brand, quality, etc., the whisky producer finds it nec-
essary to cater to those who control his ultimate outlets.24 Like druggists,2 or-
ganized liquor retailers have made and broken even nationally advertised
brands by their own promotional activities.26 Distillers, often precluded by
statute (as in Indiana2 ) from entering the distribution field, can ill-afford to in-
cur retailers' enmity and generally accede to their demands for price mainte-
nance at levels permitting high retail mark-ups.28 Wholesalers, on the other
hand, do not occupy a similarly strategic position because they do not influence
the consuming public directly.29 Distillers' threats of withdrawing distributor-
ships in branded whiskies are sufficiently effective to bring recalcitrant jobbers
into line;o and the latter are often made unwilling parties to discount "deals"
24 "Some distillers' approach to resale price maintenance is that retailers practically boy-
cott goods not under retail price maintenance and therefore in order to retain good will the
distiller must conform." FTC, op. cit. supra note 21, at 393 (see same authority at 361, 364-67).
25 FTC, op. cit. supra note 21, at 166-218, describes the tremendous pressure retail drug
organizations have managed to exert upon manufacturers in compelling resale price mainte-
nance.
2 Concrete instances of retail organization triumphing over a Big Four distiller who favored
price-cutting at the retaillevel are described in FTC, op. cit. supra note 21, at 363-67. Similarly
successful price maintenance by retailers coercing reluctant distillers seems to have provided
the background for Calvert Distilling Co. v. Brandon, 24 F. Supp. 857 (W.D.S.C., 1938), and
cases cited note 22 supra. According to Ross Federal Research Corp., Consumer Buying
Habits with Regard to Alcoholic Beverages (1937), 41.68% of the customers of package stores
in nineteen large cities relied wholly on the recommendation of the retailer in purchasing liquor
and 48.14% of customers at bars relied on the bartender's judgment, while in the latter case it
was estimated that of those customers ordering straight drinks by specific brand 44.10%
could be "switched" and of those ordering mixed drinks 48.74% could be "switched." See also
Abrahamson, op. cit. supra note 18, at 399-400, 403 n.1, 413-16.
27 Ind. Stat. Ann. § 12-514 (Burns, 1933). Distillers presently seem desirous of entering the
field at least at the wholesale level, The Whiskey Rebellion, 35 Fortune, No. 6, at 140, 143
(June 1947). Seagram once threatened New York City distributors by cutting off supply for a
short time and obtaining a license for its own wholesale outlet, Sea-Cal-Frank, which appar-
ently is still good although as yet unexercised. Business Week at 37 (Dec. 11, 1948).
28 FTC, op. cit. supra note 21, at 358. Perhaps the greatest mystery in the liquor industry
is exactly why distillers have promoted or enforced resale price maintenance. The FTC Re-
port concludes that retail pressure is sufficient; and this is the position here adopted. On
the other hand, the view entertained by many members of the industry personally interviewed
is that retailers in the Midwest are generally too weak to maintain concerted action against dis-
tillers. Another motive for resale price maintenance, which might be responsible for this very
condition, could be preventing the growth of retail units (similar to A & P) capable of bargain-
ing on a par. Finally, resale price maintenance may simply be another method of keeping big
competitors in line. See note 20 supra, and note 153 infra.
29 Wholesalers must also overcome the effect upon retailers of "missionary" work by dis-
tillers' representatives. W. W. Wachtel, President of Calvert, in his testmony before the
TNEC emphasized the importance of promotional work on the retail level. TNEC hearing,
op. cit. supra note 15, at 2551, 2566-67.
30 As well, many wholesalers are "tied" to distillers who have granted quite substantial
credit to them. Ibid., at 2509, 2520.
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benefitting retailers.3' Unlike retailers, whisky wholesalers are few in number
and their profit margins are thin.2
In the light of this factual background it may be useful to reconstruct the
strategy of the parties in Kiefer-Stewart v. Seagram. Indiana wholesalers saw in
the termination of OPA an opportunity by concerted action to increase margins
greatly reduced by wartime taxation. Seagram and Calvert, on the other hand,
faced a declining post-war consumer market.33 Acquiescence to wholesalers' de-
mands would have inevitably resulted in higher retail prices and possibly a large
drop in volume and profits for the distillers. Adopting what may have seemed
their only rational course, Seagram and its subsidiary exerted counter-pressure
on rising prices at the wholesale level where they could lower prices without los-
ing the good will of retailers.
Between 1946 and 1948 Distillers Corporation-Seagrams Limited once
again assumed leadership of the whisky industry. Seagrams increased its profits
after taxes from $24,530,000 in 1946 to $52,500,000 in 1948, pushed its sales up
fifty-three per cent while total sales for the industry fell twenty-five per cent,
and in 1948 had control of thirty per cent of the U.S. whisky business.3 4 Whether
this amazing success is even partially attributable to the policy litigated in the
Kiefer-Stewart case apparently no one knows. It is certainly possible that such
a program, pursued, as it was, on a nation-wide scale,u would contribute to such
results.
3' 1 Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on Sen. 206, 78th
Cong. 1st Sess. 220-21 (1943). Midwest wholesalers often have no contracts; and their fran-
chises, when written, contain ten-day cancellation clauses. Representatives of both Illinois
and Indiana wholesale dealers termed the distillers' power one of "life and death." Conces-
sions to retailers, which under resale price maintenance are pure profit and cannot legally be
passed on to the consumer, are apparently still quite common. For a general discussion of the
position of wholesalers and retailers in the whisky business see Abrahamson, Whiskey-The
Incidence of Public Tolerance in Price Policy in Hamilton, Price and Price Policies 395,417-20,
422 (1938).
2 High unit margins have attracted large numbers into the retail liquor business even during
times of falling consumption. Business Week at 70 (Feb. 5, 1949) reported that in New York,
although sales volume at wholesale alone had dropped from 280 million in 1946 to 215 million in
1948, 1,128 new retail outlets had opened during the same period. In Indiana, according to
the brief submitted by the Indiana Retail Package Liquor Stores Ass'n in support of Indiana
House Bill No. 131 (Feb. 20, 1951) at page 4: "In 1940-41 about 3,500,000 gallons of distilled
spirits were consumed. In 1949 that figure had fallen to 2,900,000 of distilled spirits. During the
same period the number of package stores has increased in Indiana from 470 in 1940 to 800
stores in 1949." The number of wholesalers on the other hand, according to the Indiana
Wholesale Liquor Dealers Ass'n, has not varied by more than one or two units since repeal.
The wholesalers' mark-up, although once 17 per cent, now rarely exceeds 10 per cent on an
average.
33 "People are drinking about as much liquor in 1949 as they drank last year. But that's
not particularly good news. For consumption in 1948 was 6% below 1947. And 1947 was down
a whacking 23% off from 1946." Liquor Is a Price Problem, Business Week at 25 (July 9, 1949).
See note 18 supra.
34 Seagram in the Chips, 38 Fortune, No. 3, at 97 (Sept. 1948). See Younger Blends, Busi-
ness Week at 22 (June 19, 1948).
5 Testimony at the trial indicates the broad scope of Seagram and Calvert's "hold the line
policy"; and the fact that these companies were carrying on an extensive advertising campaign
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Perhaps no other situation challenges the rationale underlying the per se rule
more rigorously than maximum resale price-fixing by sellers. So dissimilar from
cases previously decided under that rule36 did the Kiefer-Stewart situation ap-
pear, that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit apparently felt com-
pelled to distinguish between illegal price-fixing and the Seagram-Calvert
"agreement to prevent an increase in the resale price."3 7 Although such a dis-
tinction is conceptually unworkable,3" it is not difficult to sympathize Nx ith the
motives which inspired it. Price-fixing has been excoriated because it interferes
with "the free play of market forces";39 yet maximum resale price-fixing, as a
means of overcoming monopolistic influences on lower levels of distribution,
may prove extremely useful in the process of freeing those forces. If distributors
were competitive, they themselves would drive prices down when demand con-
ditions were such as to make lower consumer prices advantageous to the pro-
ducer." The market situation underlying the Kiefer-Stewart case makes this
motive to stimulate competition at distribution levels a quite probable explana-
tion for the distillers' actions. Arguably, the ruling in Kiefer-Stewart, rather
than promoting the economic policies embodied in the Sherman Act, may have
disarmed manufacturers of one of their few weapons against monopolistic dis-
tributors 4 '
against inflated whisky prices seems to corroborate this. Transcript of Record 71-72, 253,
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). Not to be overlooked is
the effect of Seagrams' vigorous general advertising program. Seagrams not only spends more
on advertising than any other whisky-maker; but as well it stood eleventh among the largest
advertisers in the United States in 1950. 58 Time, No. 23, at 100 (Dec. 3, 1951).
The vast majority of cases involved minimum and absolute price-fixing by sellers. Of
the Supreme Court decisions varying from this pattern, Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S.
375, 392 (1905), upheld an indictment charging defendants with conspiring "to arbitrarily,
from time to time raise, lower, and fix prices, and to maintain uniform prices"; but the Court
did not discuss the maximum price-fixing charge and seems to have passed upon this aspect
as part of a general scheme to monopolize the industry by exclusionary tactics.
37 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 182 F. 2d 228, 235 (C.A. 7th, 1950).
38 Nor is it reconcilable with the language in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940), where the definition of "price-fixing" was broadened to include not only the
setting of specific minima or maxima but activities involving any form of tampering with
market prices. The case itself involved practices which tended to drive market prices up but
in no sense involved anything like the specific determination of price levels which ceiling-setting
entails. Much earlier a Circuit Judge had stated: "It is clear ... that restraint of trade is not
... to be tested by the prices that result from the combination. Indeed, combination that
leads directly to lower prices to the consumer may, within the doctrine of the cases, even as
against the consumer be restraint of trade." United States v. Swift & Co., 122 Fed. 522 (C.C.
Ill., 1903), aff'd 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
39 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
40 Resale Price Maintenance and the Anti-Trust Laws, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 369, 376
(1951).
41 Peppin, Price-Fixing Agreements Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 28 Calif. L. Rev.
297, 667 at 731 n. 390 (1940), and see note 6 supra. Kiefer-Stewart argued quite effectively,
however, that "police power cannot be exercised by a combination of private individuals. To
permit them to do so would be to delegate the authority of the government to private parties
1952]
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The Court of Appeals was persuaded that defendants were "impaled on one
prong of a two-hored dilemma."42 Had Seagram and Calvert yielded to whole-
saler pressure (and to the consequent inevitable demands for higher retail
prices), they would have run the risk of antitrust prosecution for price-fixing
with groups which, because of their horizontal organization, are not within the
exemption afforded by the Miller-Tydings Amendment. 43 Nor could the dis-
tillers have brought a treble damage action against the conspiring wholesalers,
as suggested by the Supreme Court,44 and continued to do business successfully
in the areas where those wholesalers operated. Not only would it be impractical
to set up outlets for distribution of a single brand; but also distillers are pre-
cluded by statute from doing their own distributing and from dealing with other
than licensed wholesalers. 45 Hence, according to the "dilemma" argument, dis-
tillers (and many other manufacturers) are effectively restricted to a choice be-
tween two forms of price-fixing, either of which entails potential antitrust liabili-
ty after the Kiefer-Stewart decision.
If one assumes, tentatively, the existence of such a dilemma, there are cogent
policy arguments favoring non-liability when a producer chooses to indulge in
maximum price-fixing. Confronted with the risk of prosecution whether they
yield to distributors or fight them, producers in a majority of instances will
probably choose the former course. 46 Evidential barriers to establishing that
and to deprive even suspected persons of the protection of the antitrust laws." Brief for Peti-
tioner at 38, Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 340 U.S. 211 (1951). Certainly the
antitrust cases are on its side. Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade
Commission, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F. 2d 233
(App. D.C., 1942). One does wonder, nevertheless, whether the distillers would ever find it
advantageous to bring a treble damage action, especially when they must continue to sell
through the same wholesale outlets.
42 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 182 F. 2d 228, 234 (C.A. 7th, 1950).
4 3 One of Seagram's subsidiaries, Frankfort Distilleries, had already suffered twice for
participation in such vertical-horizontal agreements. "[Whatever may be the rights of an indi-
vidual producer under the Miller-Tydings Amendment to make price maintenance contracts or
to refuse to sell his goods to those who will not make such contracts, a combination to compel
price maintenance in commerce among the states violates the Sherman Act." United States v.
Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 296 (1945). Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frank-
fort Distilleries, Inc., 101 F. 2d 79 (C.A. 2d, 1939). It is interesting to note that in these
cases pressure for price maintenance appears to have originated in the wholesale and retail
groups. Connecticut Importing Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 129 F. 2d 651 (C.A. 2d,
1942), contains a description of the manner in which even wholesalers were able to make their
influence felt in forcing a distiller to enforce price maintenance.
44 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951).
45 See text and note at note 27 supra.
46 In a number of states, including Indiana, there is no choice, fair trade having been made
mandatory for distillers. Indiana's requirement, introduced shortly after the events which
culminated in the Kiefer-Stewart case, is imposed by regulations of the Indiana Alcoholic
Beverage Commission as a prerequisite to "price and brand" liquor advertising. Brief for
Respondents at 24 n. 11 and Transcript of Record at 215, Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram &
Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). See notes 14 and 23 supra.
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fair trade agreements are in fact unlawful horizontal arrangements make suc-
cessful prosecution by the justice Department (or even private persons) less
likely than suits by injured distributors,47 and the latter are certain to prove
more expensive to producers. 48 In an economy permeated with "fair" trade
agreements which have seriously restricted the benefits of competition to ulti-
mate consumers 49 and increased the instability of the business community by
adding immensely to the number of marginal distributors, 0 the Supreme
Court's decision would not seem to promote the ends which the Sherman Act
was intended to serve.
But there are significant defects in the "dilemma" argument. First, nothing
in the Supreme Court's opinion prohibits a single trader from fixing resale price-
ceilings-only conspiring to do so is proscribed;5 and therefore the dilemma de-
scribed will confront only the trader who must conspire with another in fixing
prices. This answer to the "dilemma" argument is not a cogent one. The concept
"conspiracy" has been so extended by antitrust decisions as to make it doubtful
that conspiracy would be found lacking in any resale price-fixing situation. It is
well settled that illegal price-fixing conspiracies can exist between a parent and
its wholly owned subsidiary; 2 and it seems likely that such conspiracies will be
found to exist among the officers of a single corporate entity.53 Even more impor-
47 FTC, Report on Resale Price Maintenance LXI (1945).
48 See Triple Damage-It's Murder, Business Week at 59 (April 22, 1950), and compare
with the almost nominal (for big business) maximum fine per count recoverable in criminal
actions against violators of the Sherman Act. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1 (1951).
49 "It is obvious from the Miller-Tydings Act and the fair trade laws now flourishing in
forty-five states that we don't want price competition in a large section of retail trade." Mason,
The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1265
(1949). "[Rlesale price maintenance, legalized to correct abuses of extreme price competition,
is subject to use as a means of effecting enhancement of prices by secret agreements and
restraint of competition by coercive action on the part of interested cooperating trade groups
.. in such ways and to such an extent as to make it economically unsound and undesirable in
a competitive economy." FTC, op. cit. supra note 47, at LXIV.
50 See note 32 supra.
51 "Seagram and Calvert acting individually perhaps might have refused to deal with
petitioner or with any or all of the Indiana wholesalers. But the Sherman Act makes it an
offense for respondents to agree among themselves to stop selling to particular customers."
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951).
52 Schine Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 116 (1948) (conspiracy found
among parent corporation, three officers and directors of the parent, and five wholly owned sub-
sidiaries); United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F. 2d 376 (C.A. 7th, 1941) (conspiracy
found among GMC and two of its wholly owned subsidiaries, GMSC and GMAC); cf. United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (conspiracy found among four affiliated corporations
and two stockholder-officers); cf. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173
(1944) (conspiracy among nine affiliated companies); cf. United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
332 U.S. 218 (1947) (conspiracy among majority stockholder and partially owned subsidiaries).
5' Cf. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); and Schine Theatres, Inc. v.
United States, 334 U.S. 110, 116 (1948). But see Justice Jackson's dissent in Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 606 (1951), where he says: "It is admitted that if
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tant for the Kiefer-Stewart-type case is the fact that, whenever maximum resale
price-fixing is even partially successful, all the elements of an illegal agreement
or concert of action between the producer and its complying distributors must
be present; and the Miller-Tydings Amendment offers no immunity for maxi-
mum resale price-fixers.5 4
More serious defects in the "dilemma" argument are the probability of abuse
of legalized maximum resale price-fixing, the rarity of situations in which it can
be employed in overcoming illegal combinations of distributors, and the doubt-
ful value to the general economy of even the latter activity. By persuading pro-
ducers to impose resale price-ceilings on wholesalers, strong retail groups could
cut wholesale prices to themselves and yet disguise their monopsony as produc-
er-price-fixing, a practice which would certainly become popular if sellers' maxi-
mum resale price-fixing were not per se illegal. Possibly large and well-en-
trenched producers in an industry subject to extreme fluctuations might find it
profitable to keep prices down in abnormal periods, thus sacrificing some short-
run profits to maintain price stability and avoid the rigors of competition over
the long run." Again, this type of behavior would be compatible with a desire
to avoid antitrust prosecution by cautious maneuvering away from the public
limelight which often falls most glaringly on those who charge high prices and
make large profits.16 Whatever the motives, in each of the above situations the
Timken had, within its own corporate organization, set up separate departments to operate
plants in France and Great Britain [rather than subsidiary corporations] ... 'that would not
be a conspiracy. You must have two entities to have a conspiracy."' Perhaps corporate
officers qua officers are not entities distinct from the corporation itself. But this would indeed
be anomalous, for the fact that they were acting in an official capacity has not immunized
corporate officers from personal liability under the Sherman Act (e.g., Schine case).
54 See note 5 supra.
51 Such, for example, would be an acceptable explanation of facts revealed by the Celler
Committee's inquiry into the newsprint industry. Although extreme shortages made possible
a much higher return, newsprint manufacturers generally maintained low price ceilings and
fought vigorously the resulting black market. At least one freely admitted to the Committee
that the existing price, maintained by producer "self restraint," would discourage new capital
investment. Testimony of James Zellerbach, President of Crown Zellerbach Corp., 6A Hearings
before Subcommittee on Study of Mtonopoly Power of the Committee on the judiciary, H. R.
Rep. 81st Cong. 2d Sess. 916-17, 944-45 (1950). The Congressional investigation failed to re-
veal, however, why potential investors were not aware of the potential prices obtainable in the
market; and the explanation of maximum price ceilings as a method of exclusion seems unsatis-
factory for that reason. Nevertheless, it is the explanation publicly adopted by the Celler Com-
mittee. N.Y. Times § 1, p. 12, col. 1 (May 6, 1951); and Wall St. Jour., p. 2, col. 3 (May 5,
1951). A variant of this market tactic seems to have been employed by Alcoa to maintain its
monopolistic position by making the business sufficiently unattractive so as not to be worth a
battle with Alcoa's economic strength. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d
416, 426 (C.A. 2d, 1945).
56 The Newsprint investigation had overtones of this attitude as well. 6A Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power, op. cit. supra note 55, at 918-19. Such also
would appear to be one of the motivations for the setting of price levels below obtainable
market prices revealed in the recent steel investigation. 4A Hearings before Subcommittee on
Study of Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. 81st Cong. 2d Sess.
733-35 (1950).
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effect of maximum resale price-fixing would be to obstruct rather than aid auto-
matic market mechanisms in obtaining a desirable allocation of resources.
Only under the relatively rare circumstances of the principal case would a
producer be likely to employ maximum resale price-fixing to combat illegal com-
binations of distributors. Ordinarily it would be a useless weapon against any
combination whose power depends primarily on the manner in which some dis-
tributors can influence sales of a branded product by promoting nonprice factors
-a common situation in resale price maintenance cases . 7 If maintained prices
were reduced, such distributors would not only desire to push sales of competing
products on which margins were larger but would, as well, tell consumers that
lower prices were indicative of deterioration in quality. Defendants' actions in
the instant case, however, are reconcilable with the existence of "consumer in-
fluence" monopolies at the retail level. By preserving the status quo in a period
when wholesale and retail liquor prices generally were rising, it was possible for
Seagram to maintain retail margins and nevertheless undersell the market. 8 If
wholesale prices had risen as the wholesalers planned, Seagram would have had
to contend with whatever consumer influence retailers might exert or submit to
higher retail prices and lower sales volume.
Even as against a distributor combination, whose power results from state
restrictive licensing and required dealing (as is probably the case with Indiana
wholesalers), maximum resale price-fixing alone would hardly be effective in de-
stroying this power and would need to be conjoined with offsetting monopoly
power at the producer level. In the Kiefer-Stewart case, Seagram was probably
using maximum resale price-fixing as a mechanism for exerting its own coercive
market power to overcome that of the wholesaler combination. Without this
monopoly power a producer probably could not enforce his demands for maxi-
mum resale price-fixing.
Stripped of its advocate's clothing, the "dilemma" argument is a naked de-
mand that monopoly profits be distributed to different pockets. That the pro-
ducer's monopoly power in this case may not be sufficient to bring it within the
reigning interpretation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act,5 9 while the wholesaler
57 See text at notes 139-44 infra.
18 Kiefer-Stewart's version of economic occurrences during this period is much different
from that described here. It claims that prices began to rise late in 1946 when supplies were
scarce and that the decline occurred only in 1947 at which time Seagram and Calvert "executed
and filed fair trade contracts perpetuating their former maximum prices as minima." Brief for
Petitioners at 33, Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). This inter-
pretation does not jibe with other data. In the middle of 1946 Barron's reported large whisky
inventories and the prospect of sharp competition. Corrado, Bigger Whiskey Inventories, 29
Barron's at 7 (Aug. 26, 1946). At the time fair trade contracts were made not only were dis-
tillers being pushed by the new beverage commission regulation, but, as well, a 60-day holiday
had been declared on the manufacture of neutral spirits, which stimulated a buying spree in
blends. Whisky Shortage? Business Week at 21 (Oct. 18, 1947). Petitioners' version would
seem to attribute to Seagram's activities a type of irrationality not reflected in its sales and
profits for the period. See text at note 34 supra.
19 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (C.A. 2d, 1945).
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combination is probably violative of the Act, should not work in the producer's
favor. Quite commonly a method of exacting monopoly profit is held illegal
when the monopoly is not.6 0
III
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc. is a far more significant decision
when its facts are viewed in the limited perspective adopted by the Supreme
Court. On a record totally devoid of evidence or findings that the defendants
were capable of restraining competition by influencing the market price of
whisky or that they actually produced an effect on the market, the Court held
their agreement illegal per se.8 ' Indeed, the Kiefer-Stewart jury was expressly in-
structed that power and effect were wholly irrelevant to the illegality of a price-
fixing agreement under the Sherman Act.6" Kept clearly before the courts, this
ratio decidendi could serve in future antitrust litigation to relieve the govern-
60 Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 310 (1949), presents an
illustration of this principle recognized by the Court as such. There exclusive supply contracts
with retailers were held illegal per se although the Court expressly admits that, if the re-
tailers had been agents of the supplier, the arrangements would probably have been upheld.
Even better examples are the "Tie-in" cases such as International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944);
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), which preclude
patentees from tying in unpatented articles with sales of patented products. The only satis-
factory economic explanation for this behavior is that it represents a form of price discrimina-
tion. Where consumer demand for the patented article varies directly with the consumer's
use of an unpatented article, it is possible to maximize profits by charging above-market prices
for the unpatented article tied to the patented product. The increment above market price on
the unpatented article is actually part of the price of the patented product. Despite the lan-
guage of the courts, this is clearly exploitation of the sanctioned patent monopoly, not ex-
tension thereof.
Another example is the prohibition on resale price maintenance by a patentee under a cross-
licensing plan, United States v. Line Materials Co., 333 U.S. 287, 314-15 (1947), although
again the Court (probably erroneously) speaks of extension as opposed to exploitation of the
patent monopoly. See Automatic Radio Co. v. Hazeltine, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 838 (1950),
upholding block patent licensing and a percentage-of-total-sales royalty agreement as mere
exploitation of the patent monopoly over a vigorous protest "that the patentee' received
royalties on unpatented products as part of the price for the use of the patent."
61 The complaint contains allegations (probably inaccurate) that during 1940 through 1942
Distillers Corporation-Seagrams, Ltd., controlled 80 per cent of the spirit blend sales in the
United States, spirit blends in 1946 representing 89.6 per cent of the whisky sold. Transcript
of Record at 6-7. Although spirit blends represented only 48 per cent of the market when
Seagram had 80 per cent control and by 1946 Seagram undoubtedly had a much smaller per-
centage, its power, even then, was probably sufficient to be felt in the market. But the salient
parts of these allegations were denied in the answer (Transcript of Record at 18-19); and plain-
tiff made no attempt to repeat or substantiate them in the course of the trial.
12 "If, therefore, you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such a contract or
conspiracy was entered into by the defendants for the purpose of fixing the resale prices of
their products, then you shall find that such contract was illegal within the meaning of this
statute, and it will not be necessary for you to go any further into the reasons why it was illegal
•.. it is illegal within itself... You need not consider whether the prices so fixed were
reasonable, nor whether the price-fixers controlled the market, or that some desirable ends
were served." Transcript of Record at 267. For exception to the instruction see ibid., at 271,
354.
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ment, as well as private parties, of the tedious and expensive burden of present-
ing elaborate industry studies and expert economic testimony intended to dem-
onstrate the effect and power of price-fixing combinations. 63 Precedent makes it
extremely doubtful that these relaxed evidential requirements will be considered
applicable only in resale price-fixing cases. At the other extreme, a logical but
dangerously expansive interpretation of Kiefer-Stewart could make those re-
quirements applicable in every case properly arising under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, since almost every economic arrangement prohibited by that
statutory provision has price affectation as an ultimate objective.14 For a prog-
nosis of the extent to which the per se category is likely to be expanded, it is
necessary to re-examine the evolution of the price-fixing rule of which Kiefer-
Stewart represents a noteworthy development.
With some relatively insignificant exceptions, 5 federal courts prior to 1911
struck down the price-fixing agreements which came before them.66 Evidence of
61 For excellent descriptive discussions of the evidential problems involved in antitrust
prosecution, see McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64
Harv. L. Rev. 27 (1950); Whitney, The Trial of an Anti-Trust Case, 5 Record of N.Y. Bar
449 (1950); Dession, The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of Fact, 58 Yale L.J.
1019, 1242 (1949).
64 "In the cases considered by this Court since the Standard Oil Co. case in 1911 some form
of restraint of commercial competition has been the sine qua non to the condemnation of con-
tracts, combinations or conspiracies under the Sherman Act, and in general restraints upon
competition have been condemned only when their purpose or effect was to raise or fix the
market price." Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 500 (1940).
65 United States v. Nelson, 52 Fed. 646, 647 (D.C. Minn., 1892) (upholding an agreement
among midwestern lumber dealers to raise prices above the prevailing market because there
was no allegation as to market effect and because the judge believed that no price-fixing
agreement could be successful unless the parties controlled all of the commodity); Gibbs v.
McNeeley, 102 Fed. 594, 596 (W.D. Wash., 1900) (agreements fixing prices and limiting
production among producers of red cedar shingles held not illegal in absence of showing that
prices or quotas were unreasonable); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Jaynes Drug Co., 149 Fed. 838
(C.C. Mass., 1906) (upholding a system of resale price maintenance between a patent medicine
manufacturer and its jobbers and retailers); Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber
Works Co., 154 Fed. 358 (C.A. 7th, 1907) (upholding a system of resale price maintenance and
production control between a patentee and his manufacturing licensees).
6United States v. Jellico Mt. Coal & Coke Co., 46 Fed. 432 (C.C.Tenn., 1891) (resale price
maintenance by all mine owners and dealers in Nashville area); United Statesv. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (agreement among competing railroads to maintain
rates on traffic south and west of Missouri River); United States v. Hopkins, 82 Fed. 529 (C.C.
Kan., 1897) (combination of all but one of the livestock commission merchants buying and
selling at Kansas City Stockyards, the only available public market for a large number of
states, to fix minimum commission rates); United States v. Coal Dealers' Ass'n of California,
85 Fed. 252 (C.C. Calif., 1898) (agreement among retail and wholesale coal dealers controlling
between 75 and 90 per cent of the domestic fuel traffic in San Francisco to maintain prices and
exclude price-cutters); United States v. joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) (agreement
among competing railroads to maintain freight rates between Chicago and Atlantic coast);
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (division of territory and
price-fixing agreement among six major pipe manufacturers who, within the freight margin
handicapping Atlantic seaboard manufacturers had a practical monopoly in thirty-six states);
Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co. v. United States, 115 Fed. 610 (C.A. 6th, 1902) (exclusive sales
agency agreement among producers of 30 per cent of coal and 40 per cent of coke produced in
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power and effect, as well as purpose, was present in all the cases, however;6 7 and
it is not clear from the opinions which were considered necessary or sufficient.
Arguably the Supreme Court's reliance on the word "every" in Section 1 of the
Act indicated a desire to condemn all price-fixing agreements regardless of ef-
fect or the power of the combination. 6 On the other hand, in United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Association Justice Peckham wrote:
In this light it is not material that the price of an article may be lowered. It is the
power of the combination to raise it .... Nor is it for the substantial interests of the
country that any one commodity be within the sole power... of one powerful combina-
tion of capital.6 9
These words envision substantial, if not complete, control of the market as a
basis for price-fixing illegality-not mere purpose alone. Subsequently the same
court felt obliged to introduce a requirement that the restraint on commerce be
of a direct nature "or else there would scarcely be an agreement or contract
among businessmen that could not be said to have, indirectly or remotely, some
bearing on interstate commerce, and possibly to restrain it. ' ' 70
During this period, then, despite rejection of the rule of reason, the Supreme
Court appears to have been concerned with the obvious power and effect of the
large combinations before it. Only in Judge Taft's statement of the common law
-that "where the sole object of the parties in making the contract as expressed
Kanawha district of W.Va.); Ellis v. Inman, Poulsen & Co., 131 Fed. 182 (C.A. 8th, 1904)
(combination of only manufacturers of seasoned and kiln-dried lumber in Portland area re-
fusing to sell to contractors who had purchased rough lumber elsewhere unless they paid
difference in purchase price and the maintained price of combination's rough lumber); United
States v. Swift & Co., 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (conspiracy of midwestern meat-packers controlling
60 per cent of national meat production to fix prices and not to bid against each other on live-
stock markets); Leonard v. Abner-Drury Brewing Co., 25 App. D.C. 161 (1905) (attempt by
four of five brewers in D.C. to compel fifth to raise his price through labor boycott struck
down under common law); United States v. McAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 Fed. 823 (S.D.N.Y.,
1906) (price-fixing agreement between two manufacturers producing 85 per cent of licorice
paste in United States); Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227 (1909)
(association of producers of more than 98 per cent of all the wall paper in the United States
which fixed prices and regulated production).
67 There is some question about Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co. v. United States, 115 Fed.
610, 624 (C.A. 6th, 1902), where it was stated that the "law reaches combinations which may
fall short of complete control of a trade or business and does not await the consolidation of
many small combinations into the huge 'trust' which shall control the production and sale
of a commodity."
68 "Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states ... is hereby declared illegal." 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended,
15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1951). "[TIhe plain and ordinary meaning of such language is not limited to
that kind of contract alone which is in unreasonable restraint of trade, but all contracts are
included in such language, and no exception or limitation can be added without placing in the
act that which has been omitted by Congress." United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,
166 U.S. 290, 328 (1897). Whether a particular agreement is "in restraint of trade," however,
may be another matter.
69 166 U.S. 290, 324 (1897). (Emphasis added.)
70 United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898).
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therein is merely to restrain competition and enhance or maintain prices, it
would seem that there was nothing to justify or excuse the restraint" 71 -does
one find real support for the proposition that general purpose alone is sufficient
to sustain a charge of violating the Sherman Act.
Between 1911 and 1927 the direct price-fixing cases followed two distinctive
patterns--systems of resale price maintenance and trade association arrange-
ments. Beginning with Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons,7 2 the Supreme
Court, with but one minor deviation 7 3 held that agreements between a pro-
ducer and his distributors to fix minimum resale prices were illegal under the
Sherman Act. A majority of these cases involved rather obvious power and ef-
fect features,7 4 but in at least two7" the Court seems to have verged upon a hold-
ing that a price-fixing purpose alone is illegal. In the Dr. Miles case the Court
did not discuss the producer's general market position but contented itself with
71 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 282 (C.A. 6th, 1898), where he
adds: "Upon this review of the law and the authorities, we can have no doubt that the associa-
tion of the defendants... however great the competition they had to encounter. .. was
void at common law, because in restraint of trade, and tending to monopoly." Ibid., at 291.
2 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
73 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1918), came up on an indictment inter-
preted by the lower court as not charging an agreement but simply threats not to sell to dis-
tributors who sold below specified retail prices. The Court held that it was within the privilege
of a property owner to sell to whom he pleased as long as he did not exact price maintenance
agreements from his buyers. Although thoroughly limited by cases permitting agreements to
be implied from a course of dealing, e.g., United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85
(1920), the Colgate case has shown amazing vitality in recent lower federal court decisions,
e.g., Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge Distributing Co., 189 F. 2d 913, 916 (C.A. 2d, 1951);
and Justice Black must have had it in mind when he wrote: "Seagram and Calvert acting
individually perhaps might have refused to deal with petitioner or with any or all of the Indi-
ana wholesalers. But the Sherman Act makes it an offense for respondents to agree among
themselves to stop selling to particular customers." Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons,
340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951).
7 4 Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912) (agreements between
patentee and licensees controlling 85 per cent of the production of enamelled iron sanitary
ware to fix jobbers' resale prices held illegal as outside the privileges of a patent monopoly);
Straus v. American Publishing Ass'n, 231 U.S. 222 (1913) (attempt by 75 per cent of na-
tion's publishers, urged on by an association representing a majority of booksellers, to refuse
sale to department store not complying with resale price schedule is held illegal as to both
copyrighted and uncopyrighted works); Ford Motor Co. v. Union Motor Sales Co., 244 Fed.
156 (C.A. 6th, 1917) (manufacturers of patented article not permitted to set price for resale by
dealer purchasing on conditional sale); Boston Store of Chicago v. American Gramophone Co.,
246 U.S. 8 (1918) (patentee not permitted to fix resale price on gramophone sold to retailer);
United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920) (same); Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921) (alleged conspiracy between manufacturer and jobbers of
trademarked cleanser to maintain resale price held illegal, but reversed for error in instruc-
tions); Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 810 (C.A. 3d, 1921) (patentee, whole-
salers, and retailers). But see United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) (pat-
entee permitted to fix resale prices on patented articles for wholesalers and dealers acting as
its bona fide agents and to compel a manufacturing licensee to erect a similar system of re-
sale price maintenance).
75 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911), and FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
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the fact that the agreements were made "with 'most of the jobbers and whole-
sale druggists of the country,' . . . having for their purpose the control of the
entire trade."7 6 In language reminiscent of Judge Taft's broad dictum referred
to above, Justice Hughes stated that "agreements... having for their sole pur-
pose the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the
public interest and void."77 As precedent for a literal rule of per se illegality,
however, the case is quite vulnerable to distinction. Not only was it decided be-
fore Justice White's famus pronouncement of the "rule of reason,"7 8 but it in-
volved a "secret process" which may have been considered an element of market
power comparable to a patent. Finally, recognizing that "the advantages of es-
tablished retail prices primarily concern the dealers,"7 9 not producers, the
Court appears to have treated the plaintiff-producer as representative of a com-
bination of dealers,80 in this case a large percentage of the nation's druggists.
By their particularly influential form of consumer taste control, Dr. Miles' dis-
tributors may have been compelling resale price maintenance much as liquor
retailers appear to do with their control of outlets and similar consumer influ-
ence. It is at least arguable that resale price maintenance under these circum-
stances involves significant market power and effect.8'
More than offsetting the vague advances of Dr. Miles Medical Co. toward the
Kiefer-Stewart position, Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States,2 upheld a
grain exchange rule fixng, at the closing bid, prices between daily sessions on
grain "to arrive." Justice Brandeis wrote:
But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a
test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every
regulation of trade, restrains.... The true test of legality is whether the restraint im-
posed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint
is applied ... the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.8 3
76 220 U.S. 373, 400 (1911). 77 Ibid., at 408.
78 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
79 220 U.S. 373, 407 (1911). 80 Ibid., at 408-409.
81 See discussion of the "separate market" theory of resale price maintenance in text at
notes 139-44 infra. Decided long after the rule of reason had become imbedded in antitrust
precedent, FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922), echoes the sweeping pro-
hibition of resale price-fixing found in the Dr. Miles case. It is possibly distinguishable as an
interpretation, not of the Sherman Act, but of the more specific prohibitions in Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1951).
More important, the opinion recognizes the market power aspects of resale price maintenance
entered into "with the purpose and effect of securing the trade of such jobbers, wholesalers,
and retailers, and of enlisting their active support and cooperation in enlarging the sale of re-
spondent's products, to the prejudice of its competitors who do not require and enforce the
maintenance of resale prices for their products." Ibid., at 445.
- 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
83 Ibid., at 238. Further, the Government was criticized for its failure "to show that the
rule was designed to or that it had the effect of limiting the amount of grain shipped to Chicago
... or of raising or depressing prices." Ibid.
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Although the Board of Trade case makes it fairly clear that proof of all three
-purpose, power, and effect-is prerequisite to the illegality of price-fixing
agreements under the Sherman Act, its rigid evidentiary requirements were soon
relaxed by American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States. 4 There the dis-
semination of elaborate statistics and "suggestions" as to prices and production
by an association of lumber dealers controlling but one-third of the national
hardwood production was held illegal. Lacking proof of a definite agreement as
to production and prices, the Court considered this deficiency supplied by "the
disposition of men to follow their most intelligent competitors."' Although less
exacting than Justice Brandeis, justice Clarke does not appear to have discard-
ed the power and effect requirements but merely to have accepted less precise
evidence, there being obvious attempts to demonstrate the market effect of the
trade association's activities throughout the opinion."
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co.,8 7 involved similar activities (in-
cluding a basing-point system of price-fixing) on the part of an association of
linseed product manufactures and distributors controlling "a very large part"
of the total linseed market.88 The combination was held illegal because "its
necessary tendency [was] to suppress competition in trade between the states.""9
Justice Stone, who upheld comparable trade association activities in Maple
Flooring Mfrs' Ass'n v. United States9" and Cement Mfrs' Protective Ass'n v.
United States," distinguished the American Column and Linseed cases relying
heavily on "the fact that the court inferred from the peculiar circumstances of
each case that concerted action had resulted or would necessarily result in tend-
ing arbitrarily to lessen production or increase prices." 2 It is possible that the
Court intended the "necessary tendency" requirement to apply only where no
express agreement among competitors could be shown; but the words them-
selves would seem rather to necessitate proof of market power on the part of the
s4 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
85 Ibid., at 399.
8 Reference is made in a number of places to price increases during periods when the
association was most active (ibid., at 407-409) and to the satisfaction of the members with
the results produced (ibid., at 405-407). "While it is true that 1919 was a year of high and in-
creasing prices generally.. . we cannot but agree with the members of the 'Plan' themselves
*.. in the conclusion that the united action of this large and influential membership of dealers
contributed greatly to this extraordinary price increase." Ibid., at 409.
In a subsequent holding that the activities (which included price-fixing) of a combination
of bill posters were violative of the Sherman Act, the Court was careful to state that the combi-
nation was so large it was "practically impossible for an advertiser to utilize posters except by
employing members of the Association." Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters,
260 U.S. 501, 510 (1923).
87 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
8 Ibid., at 380. 90 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
9 Ibid., at 389. 91268 U.S. 588 (1925).
"Maple Flooring Mfrs' Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 585 (1925).
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parties to any price-fixing agreement, as was the case in Justice Stone's later
opinions.9 3
Until 1927, then, with the possible exception of Dr. Miles v. Park & Sons,
Section 1 price-fixing cases before the Supreme Court generally contained evi-
dence both of power to effect market forces and actual effect produced. The lan-
guage of the opinions, although far from clear, indicates not only recognition of
these elements but requirement of their presence before agreements as to prices
would be condemned. Such clearly was Judge Learned Hand's interpretation in
1924 when he wrote: "We should have supposed that, if one thing were definite-
ly settled, it was that the Sherman Act forbade all agreements preventing com-
petition in price among a group of buyers, otherwise competitive, if they are
numerous enough to effect [sic] the market." 4
Clarifying the trend of price-fixing law and corroborating a "power" interpre-
tation of the "necessary tendency" doctrine in the trade association cases,
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. 5 is generally recognized as the first explicit
formulation of the per se rule. Manufacturers and distributors of eighty-two per
cent of the vitreous pottery bathroom fixtures produced in the United States
combined to fix prices and limit outlets. Defendants alleged error in the trial
court's refusal to submit the question of reasonableness of the prices fixed to the
jury and in the charge that "an agreement on the part of the members of a com-
bination controlling a substantial part of an industry, upon the prices which the
members are to charge, is in itself an undue and-unreasonable restraint of trade
and commerce.""9 In upholding this charge as a correct statement of the law,
Justice Stone concluded that "uniform price-fixing by those controlling in any
substantial manner a trade or business in interstate commerce is prohibited by the
Sherman Law, despite the reasonableness of the prices agreed upon." 97 The
93 In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), which involved an express
price-fixing agreement, Justice Stone limited the per se rule to combinations with substantial
market control. In the Maple Flooring case, however, Justice Stone took pains to point out
that it was "neither alleged nor proved that there was any agreement among the members of
the Association either affecting production, fixing prices, or for price maintenance." 268 U.S.
563, 567 (1925).
Upon a theory similar to that underlying Trenton Potteries, the Court in FTC v. Pacific
States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52 (1926), held illegal under Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act an agreement to fix uniform prices to retailers made among whole-
salers controlling 75 per cent of the paper sales in the Northwest.
94 Live Poultry Dealers' Protective Ass'n v. United States, 4 F. 2d 840, 842 (C.A. 2d, 1924)"
(Emphasis added.) The general trend of antitrust cases at the time is reflected in United
States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 450-51 (1920), which contains a clear holding that
naked power in the absence of unlawful purpose or effect cannot constitute a violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. See also Butchart v. United States, 295 Fed. 577,578 (C.A. 9th,
1924).,
95 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
Ibid., at 396. (Emphasis added.)
97 Ibid., at 398. (Emphasis added.) Four years prior to Trenton Potteries, the Court had
stated, by way of dictum, that a combination of railroad companies to fix reasonable rates
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Board of Trade case was distinguished as affecting "only a small proportion of
the commerce in question" and "dealing... with a regulation of a board of
trade.., not.., a price agreement among competitors in an open market."98
Despite later expansive interpretation,99 it must be clear that Trenton Pot-
teries is precedent only for the proposition that price-fixing among parties ca-
pable of affecting the market is unreasonable per se.10 But, as a concomitant of
this increased emphasis on the combination's power, where substantial control
is proved, a conclusive presumption of market effect replaces the Board of Trade
requirement that such effect be shown. This change greatly lightened the gov-
ernment's evidential burden by permitting a percentage of the market to be sub-
stituted for an elaborate statistical study of price behavior.10
Subsequent decisions sustain the power interpretation of Trenton Potteries.
Upholding an agreement fixing royalty rates among owners of competing and
conflicting patents, the Court, in Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States,0 2
wrote: "In the absence of proof that the primary defendants had such control
of the entire industry as would make effective the alleged domination of a part,
it is difficult to see how they could by agreeing upon royalty rates control either
the price or the supply of gasoline, or otherwise restrain competition."'0 3 Not
only does justice Brandeis' opinion support the view that a price-setting agree-
ment among parties without power to affect market prices is not "price-fixing"
within the per se rule; 10 4 but, as well, it indicates that (for the "lawyer's lawyer,"
sanctioned by the ICC might be illegal under the Sherman Act although not actionable by a
private person, who, unlike the government, is limited to his remedy under the Interstate
Commerce Act. Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
09 Ibid., at 401. Noteworthy is the fact that Justice Stone makes no attempt to distinguish
the case in terms of intent or purpose as does Justice Douglas in United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,217 (1940).
99 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,225 n. 59 (1940).
100 Win. Dwight Whitney, who claims to have authored the per se rule in a Trenton Potter-
ies brief, has written an interesting apology for the phrase which he states was intended only
to convey the idea that activities which are obviously unreasonable restraints need not be
proved to be unreasonable and was not intended to overrule the Board of Trade case. Whitney,
The Trial of an Anti-Trust Case, 5 Record of N.Y. Bar 449,454 (1950).
101 "The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to con-
trol the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed today
may through economic and business changes become the unreasonable price of to-morrow.
... Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves un-
reasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular
price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the government in en-
forcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to day whether it has become un-
reasonable through the mere variation of economic conditions." United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
1- 283 U.S. 163 (1931). 10 Ibid., at 179.
104,,If combining patent owners effectively dominate an industry, the power to fix and
maintain royalties is tantamount to the power to fix prices." Ibid., at 174. The Court bases
its opinion largely on the "fact" that "cracked" gasoline and straight run gasoline (over which
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at least) the government continued to have a heavy evidential burden even if
confined to a "definite factual showing"'u 5 of power to affect the market. Con-
ceivably the Standard Oil (Indiana) holding is distinguishable by the presence
of sanctioned patent monopolies; but no such criticism may be levelled at Ap-
palachian Coals, Inc. v. United States0 6 in which the Court refused to enjoin the
establishment by otherwise competing coal producers of a common selling agen-
cy with price-fixing powers. Concluding from the evidence that the combination
was powerless "to fix the price of coal in the consuming market,'10 7 the Court
held that mere elimination of price competition between the parties without a
showing of some injurious effect on the market was not sufficient to sustain a
Section 1 indictment. Nevertheless jurisdiction was retained lest the plan should
prove effective in operation.
Appalachian Coals can be interpreted as holding that purpose without power
to fix prices is not per se illegal. As in Standard Oil (Indiana), the Court, rather
than find a violation of the Sherman Act, attributes folly to defendants who cer-
tainly must have believed they could improve market prices. Aware that the
parties intended to fi x prices among themselves, 0 the Court states that "[t]he
plan cannot be said to contemplate or involve the fixing of market prices."'0 9
Possibly, then, the case may be distinguished from Kiefer-Stewart v. Seagram
as involving bona fide "mitigation of recognized evils""' in a demoralized indus-
try rather than a specific purpose to affect market prices. Recognizing that good
intentions will not save a plan which results in actual injury to competition, the
Court seems to have thought them relevant where no danger of such injury
exists."' Subsequent price-fixing cases coming before the Hughes' Court offered
little opportunity to test this interpretation for they presented not only obvious
examples of market power but findings of a dominant intent to fix prices as
well.'2
the defendants had much less contol) were indistinguishable and completely interchangeable.
Aside from the dubious nature of the finding itself, it does not follow that the combination-
could not affect prices if the cost of producing cracked gasoline were less than that of producing
straight run, at least within the cost differential. Certainly it should have been presumed that
the defendants acted in an economically rational fashion, i.e., attempted to reap a monopoly
profit in the licensing field.
101 Ibid., at 179. M0 288 U.S. 344 (1933). 107 Ibid., at 373.
108 "The plan contemplates that prices are to be fixed by the officers of the Company at its
central office." Ibid., at 358.
101 Ibid., at 373. (Emphasis added).
110 Ibid., at 374. Such was the distinction Justice Douglas later drew in United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 216 (1940).
M "Good intentions will not save a plan otherwise objectionable, but knowledge of actual
intent is an aid in the interpretation of facts and the prediction of consequences." 288 U.S.
344, 372 (1933).
1 Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936) involved the activities of a
trade association controlling 70-80 per cent of the refined sugar in the United States whose
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Hence up to 1940 the Supreme Court had refused in both dictum and holding
to condemn agreements as to prices among parties who were not affirmatively
shown to have affected the market or to have power sufficient to make market
effect imminent and inevitable. In that year, while striking down an agreement
among major midwestern petroleum refiners to buy up the distress gasoline of
small, independent refiners then depressing the spot market, the Court indulged
in language which cannot be easily reconciled with a power interpretation of the
per se rule.
In a now famous footnote appended to United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co.," 3 Justice Douglas wrote: "But that does not mean that both a purpose and
a power to fix prices are necessary for the establishment of a conspiracy under
§1 of the Sherman Act.... [A] conspiracy to fix prices violates Section 1 of the
Act though no overt act is shown, though it is not established that the conspira-
tors had the means available for the accomplishment of their objective, and
though the conspiracy embraced but a part of the interstate or foreign commerce
in the commodity." 4 This language is clearly dictum and wholly unnecessary
to the decision, proof of effect on the market having been made (and acknowl-
edged as essential to establish jurisdictionui) and the verdict for the government
having arisen out of instructions which required the jury to find both power and
effect."'
dominant purpose, the trial court found, was "to create and maintain a uniform price struc-
ture"; Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) centered upon resale
price maintenance by distributors of 75 per cent of the first-class feature films which an ex-
hibitor with virtual monopolies in some Texas cities compelled them to enforce for the
purpose of protecting its monopoly in first-run movies from the competition of subsequent-
run houses; Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940), concerned the sub-
stantially successful program of licensee-refiners controlling 80 per cent of the nation's gaso-
line production to compel resale price maintenance by their jobbers and price maintenance
among themselves through their patentee, Ethyl.
Of the lower court antitrust decisions during this period, Connecticut Importing Co. v.
Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 101 F. 2d 79 (C.A. 2d, 1939), is noteworthy as declaring illegal,
without discussion of power and effect, a conspiracy between a producer and its Connecticut
distributors to maintain the price of whisky to retailers.
' United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
n4 Ibid., at 225 n. 59.
I'l "Under this indictment proof that prices in the Mid-Western area were raised as a result
of the activities of the combination was essential, since sales of gasoline by respondents at the
increased prices in that area were necessary in order to establish jurisdiction in the Western
District of Wisconsin." Ibid., at 224 n. 59. See "F. The Spot Market Prices during the Buying
Program." Ibid., at 194-98.
116 "The court charged the jury that it was a violation of the Sherman Act for a group of
individuals or corporations to act together to raise the prices to be charged for the commodity
which they manufactured where they controlled a substantial part of the interstate trade and
commerce in that commodity. The court stated that where the members of a combination had
the power to raise prices and acted together for that purpose, the combination was illegal....
The court then charged that, unless the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the price
rise and its continuance were 'caused' by the combination and not caused by those other fac-
tors, verdicts of 'not guilty'should be returned." Ibid., at 210-11.
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The Court in Socony-Vacuum may not have intended to discard the power in-
terpretation but simply to dilute the Trenton Potteries "substantial control" re-
quirement. Such would seem to be the thrust of its argument distinguishing a
direct price-fixung agreement (where power must be proved by showing substan-
tial market control) from an agreement to affect market prices through a pur-
chasing program (where "power may be found to exist though the combination
does not control a substantial part of the commodity.... if as a result of market
conditions, the resources available to the combinations, the timing and strategic
placing of orders and the like, effective means are at hand to accomplish the de-
sired objective.") Y7 Throughout the body of the opinion Justice Douglas ap-
pears to require that some element of power be shown to establish the illegality
of a price-fixing arrangement even if that power must be inferred from the
market effect of the agreement.
Had the sweeping dictum of footnote 59 never been written, Socony-Vacuum
would stand for simply a logical extension of the Trenton Potteries decision." 8 It
would mean only that, unlike the authors of Standard Oil (Indiana) and Ap-
palacthian Coals, Inc., the Court will not presume that price-fixers have done an
irrational or useless thing merely because they are shown not to have had sub-
stantial control of the market."9 If some peculiar quirk (as, for example, the
manner in which price-leading Standard of Indiana 20 religiously followed the
small and easily manipulated spot market in determining its midwestern prices)
should give parties lacking monopoly power the ability nevertheless to affect
market prices, exercise of this power too would be illegal per se. 2 ' But footnote
59 remains; and its reasoning by analogy to the general criminal law rule that
conspiracy to commit an unlawful act is punishable regardless of the conspira-
tors' power to achieve their object'2 appears to have prevailed in Kiefer-Stewart
v. Seagram.
217 Ibid., at 223-24.
118 Judge Learned Hand seems to have espoused this interpretation in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (C.A. 2d, 1945), where he cites the entire Socony-
Vacuum opinion for the power theory (at 427-28) but only footnote 59 for the argument con-
cerning intent alone (at 432). In United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 100 F. Supp.
504, 592 (S.D.N.Y., 1951), Judge Ryan cites footnote 59 directly for the proposition that
market domination need not be proved to establish the illegality of price-fixing.
19 Answering Justice Brandeis' argument in the Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) case that no
combination can "fix prices" unless it has the power to do so, Justice Douglas redefines price-
fixing, saying that prices "are fixed when they are agreed upon." United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). See text at note 104 supra. This, however, can be inter-
preted as meaning only that the presumption of power will be against the defendants.
20 Standard of Indiana was dropped as defendant at the trial stage.
2 Justice Douglas probably had in mind the statement in Justice Roberts' dissent that
the "evidence showed, without contradiction, that the Standard Oil Company of Indiana was
the market leader in this area, and that when it posted its price none of the other defendants
could sell at a higher price." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 257
(1940). Standard computed its retail prices on the basis of the spot market; and accordingly,
by manipulating that price, defendants were able to influence the entire price structure. Ibid.,
at 192. The apparent artificiality of this situation is probably a product of litigation technique.
" United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915).
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Footnote 59 is far from illuminating as to the exact nature of the purpose,
proof of which is a sufficient substitute for evidence of market power or effect.
From the manner in which justice Douglas distinguished the Appalachian Coals
and Board of Trade cases as involving price-fixing arrangements "not designed
to operate vis-a-vis the general consuming market and to fix prices on that mar-
ket,"128 one could conclude that the government must show more than an agree-
ment to fix prices inter se. Contributing to this interpretation is the opinion in
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 1 4 decided shortly after Socony-Vacuum. Holding
that a sit-down strike which blocked interstate shipments was not a restraint of
trade, Justice Stone argued that "in general restraints on competition have been
condemned only when their purpose or effect was to raise or fix the market price.
... Restraints on competition.., in interstate commerce is not enough, unless
the restraint is shown to have or is intended to have an effect upon prices in the mar-
ket or otherwise to deprive purchasers or consumers of the advantages which
they derive from free competition."'' If strictly adhered to, the Apex holding
would require, in the absence of evidence of market power or effect, proof of a
particular kind of price-fixing purpose-a purpose to affect market prices, not
merely those charged by the parties to the agreement. Such an approach would
be consonant with the criminal law requirement of proof of specific intent in
conspiracy cases.'2
Subsequent decisions, however, seem to hold that where, unlike the Socony-
Vacuum case, an explicit price-fixing agreement is shown, it is not necessary to
-3 310 U.S. 150, 216 (1940). The quoted statement was employed directly in distinguishing
the Appalachian Coals case. Of the Board of Trade case justice Douglas wrote: "Since it was
not aimed at price manipulation or the control of the market prices and since it had 'no ap-
preciable effect on general market prices,' the rule survived as a reasonable restraint of trade."
Ibid., at 217.
-4 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
15 Ibid., at 500. (Emphasis added.) These words have been interpreted as applicable only
where express agreements as to prices are not involved, Gundersheimer's Inc. v. Bakery &
Confectionary Workers' Internat'l Union of America, 119 F. 2d 205 (App. D.C., 1941); and,
perhaps, even more narrowly, as applicable only to labor disputes, United States v. Nat'l
Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 489-90 (1950).
I People v. Powell, 63 N.Y. 88 (1875); Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 624, 629, 635 (1941). This statement assumes that, alone, the act of fixing prices inter
se by parties without power to affect market prices is not illegal under the Sherman Act. Later
cases, holding that this act constitutes a "restraint of trade," make it possible to apply the
conspiracy rule to situations where the purpose of the parties is limited to fixing prices among
themselves and involves no intent to affect market prices. See note 138 infra. Under the Apex
case the limited act (i.e., fixing prices inter se without effect on market prices) would not be
illegal unless accompanied with a broader intent (i.e., a specific intent to affect market prices
or market power sufficient to supply such an intent). Dicta in two patent cases, Katzinger Co.
v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 397 n. 3 (1947), and MacGregor v. Westinghouse
Electric & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 405 n. 3 (1947), stating that even unexecuted price-fixing
agreements would be illegal, are reconcilable with the Apex doctrine only if it is conclusively
presumed that patentees have market power or believe they have such power. Although such
a presumption would certainly be reasonable, Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337
U.S. 293,307 (1949), the Court does not discuss the power or purpose of the parties and ap-
pears to assume that unexecuted price-fixing agreements by any parties would fall within the
ban.
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prove an intent or purpose more wrongful than an intent to fix the prices to be
charged by the parties.2 7 Except for United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate
Boards,128 these decisions may be of little value as precedent because in the main
they rest on clear and substantial proof of market power or effect.' But as evi-
1
7 E.g., United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276 (1942): "Since there was price-
fixing, the fact that there were business reasons which made the arrangements desirable to the
appellees, the fact that the effect of the combination may have been to increase the distribution
of hardboard, without increase of price to the consumer, or even to promote competition
between dealers, or the fact that from other points of view the arrangements might be deemed
to have desirable consequences would be no more a legal justification for price-fixing than were
the 'competitive evils' in the Socony-Vacuum case"; United States v. National Ass'n of Real
Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 489 (1950): "Price-fixing is per se an unreasonable restraint of
trade.... An agreement, shown either by adherence to a price schedule or by proof of con-
sensual action fixing uniform or minimum price, is itself illegal under the Sherman Act, no mat-
ter what end it was designed to serve." See cases cited note 129 infra.
128 339 U.S. 485 (1950). In this case the Supreme Court held illegal per se an agreement
among members of the Washington (D.C.) Real Estate Board to adhere to schedules fixing
minimum brokerage fees. Although the membership included only 250 of the 2000 real estate
brokers in Washington, many non-members adhered to the non-mandatory schedules which,
according to the trial judge, were intended to assure sellers that they were not being gouged
by brokers. 84 F. Supp. 802,803 (1949). It seems doubtful that this group had marketpower suf-
ficient to bring it within the Trenton Potteries "substantial control" test; but the decision may
rest on reasoning similar to that found in some of the trade association cases-notably Ameri-
can Column & Lumber. See discussion in text at notes 84-86 supra. However, the Supreme
Court opinion is not concerned with the parties' economic power and probably represents as
literal an interpretation of the per se rule as is found in the Kiefer-Stewart case.
129 United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942) (owner of controlling hardboard
patent constituted all competing manufacturers and distributors del credere agents for sales
at fixed prices; industry-wide organization held illegal as beyond patent reward); United States
v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 296 (1945) (combination of wholesalers and re-
tailers controlling 75 per cent of spiritous liquors and wines consumed in Colorado charged
with a price-fixing program the "effect, and if it were material, the purpose of [which]... was
to fix prices at an artificial level," found not within the Miller-Tydings exemption because in-
volved horizontal agreements); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 312 (1948)
(cross-licensing agreement between owners of complementary patents under which 40.77 per
cent of dropout fuse cut-outs were made, permitting one to fix resale prices of all licensees,
held illegal, such multiple agreements "establishing an intention to restrain" rather than
merely exploit patent); United States v. U.S. Gypsum, 333 U.S. 364 (1948) (patent license
agreements permitting licensor to fix minimum prices for the entire gypsum board industry
including unpatented gypsum products held illegal); United States v. Paramount Pictures,
334 U.S. 131, 144 (1948) (agreement among exhibitors, distributors, and producers to fix
minimum admission prices is held illegal per se as "part of the general plan to suppress com-
petition."); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 222
(1948) (agreement fixing the prices paid to growers by three sugar refiners constituting the
only "practical market available to beet growers" in northern California); United States v.
Women's Sportswear Mfrs' Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 463 (1949) (agreement by women's sports-
wear jobbers to employ only stitching contractors who were members of association handling
50 per cent of sportswear produced in Boston, "the intent and effect of [which was]... sub-
stantially to restrict competition and to control prices and markets."); United States v.
New Wrinkle, Inc., CCH 1952 Trade Reg. Rep. 67,214 (1952) (industry-wide price-fixing
by means of provisions in patent licenses granted by patent holding company to which two
manufacturing concerns had assigned their patents on wrinkle paint finish).
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942) (owner of patents covering lens
blanks and finishing process who sold blanks to distributor-finishers fixed resale prices of
finished lenses; such price-fixing not exempted by Miller-Tydings Act which does not apply
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dence of a general trend toward a more literal interpretation of the per se rule
their language and number, especially in the lower federal courts, is quite im-
pressive."' This movement toward an unconditional prohibition on express
price-fixing agreements gained additional impetus from the treatment afforded
the phrase "illegal per se" in recent important antitrust cases. In both United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.' and United States v. Columbia Steel Co.' 32 il-
legality per se was distinguished from those situations in which power or a par-
ticular wrongful purpose must be shown. 3
to sales to a processor); and United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944)
(resale price maintenance agreements between distributor of unpatented lenses and its whole-
salers and retailers held illegal per se), present power relationships more closely analogous to
Kiefer-Stewart, although both involve minimum resale price-fixing.
130 A sampling of the lower federal court decisions which have parroted a literal per se rule
in fact-situations involving more or less obvious market power includes: Truck Drivers'
Local No. 421, etc. v. United States, 128 F. 2d 227 (C.A. 8th, 1942); United States v. Sheffield
Farms Co., 43 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y., 1942); Food and Grocery Bureau of S.Calif., Inc. v.
United States, 139 F. 2d 973 (C.A. 9th, 1943); United States v. Spokane Fuel Dealers Credit
Ass'n, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.Wash., 1944); Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.
2d 175, 179 (C.A.7th, 1945);Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F.Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y., 1948);
United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc., 179 F. 2d 426 (App. D.C.
1949); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co.,
184 F. 2d 552 (C.A. 4th, 1950). For a more careful statement of the rule: Ring v. Spina, 148 F.
2d 647,650 (C.A. 2d, 1945). In Maryland &VirginiaMilk Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. UnitedStates,
193 F. 2d 907, 916 (App. D.C., 1951), the Court of Appeals found in favor of producer-defend-
ants alleged to have fixed prices by means of requirement contracts under which the dairies
paid prices differing according to the use to which identical raw milk was put. In language
similar to that of the Appalachian Coals case, the court held that mere stipulation of sales
price in an ordinary sales contract could not beillegal per se unless "it gives to the contracting
parties power which may be wielded to the disadvantage and detriment of the public and which
may become oppressive as against competitors and tryannical as against consumers." The
arrangement is probably explainable as a method of price discrimination on the consuming
market by the sanctioned (agricultural association) producer-monopoly. See discussion
note 60 supra.
131 "Exploration of these phases of the cases would not be necessary if, as the Department
of Justice argues, vertical integration of producing, distributing and exhibiting motion pictures
is illegal per se. But the majority of the Court does not take that view. In the opinion of the
majority the legality of vertical integration under the Sherman Act turns on (1) the purpose
or intent with which it was conceived, or (2) the power it creates and the attendant purpose
or intent." 334 U.S. 131, 173-74 (1948).
132 "A restraint may be unreasonable either because a restraint otherwise reasonable is
accompanied with a specific intent to accomplish a forbidden restraint or because it falls within
the class of restraints that are illegal per se." 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948). There is no attempt in
this language to define the restraints which are unreasonable per se. If an agreement regarding
prices entered into by parties unable and not intending to affect market prices is not "price-
fixing," then the statement that "price-fixing is illegal per se" does not alter the law as it was
in 1940; and the statement above is perfectly consistent with such a definition.
1 13flstrative of the extent to which a literal per se rule has taken hold, a line of patent cases
holds that in a suit for royalties a patent licensee may not either expressly or impliedly be es-
topped by his license from setting up the invalidity of the patent if the license contains a price-
fixing provision, because such a provision would be violative of the Sherman Act if the patent
were invalid. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) (no implied estop-
pel); American Cutting Alloys, Inc. v. General Electric Co., 135 F. 2d 502, 504 (C.A. 2d, 1943)
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To this mass of dicta Kiefer-Stewart appears finally to add a direct holding.
Reasoning not from available evidence of market power" 4 but from the evidence
actually adduced on trial, one could not help but conclude that only the existence
of an agreement, not market power and effect, was at issue in Kiefer-Stewart;
and the jury instructions confirm this conclusion."' The Supreme Court's per-
emptory rejection of Seagrams' argument'that maximum resale price-fixing was
its only practical weapon against illegal combinations of distributors" 8 indicates
that benevolent intent is no longer a justification for price-fixing even in the ab-
sence of market power and effect. '7 Broadly interpreted, Kiefer-Stewart is direct
precedent for the proposition that, in the absence of statutory exemption, ex-
press price-fixing agreements are literally illegal per se. Indeed, Justice Black's
identification of "restraint of trade" with restraint of individual traders' free-
dom opens even broader vistas of per se illegality.Y8
Possibly, however, the Kiefer-Stewart holding will be restricted to the resale
price-fixing situation. 9 Thus limited, the case arguably represents no extension
(no express estoppel); Katzinger Co.v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co.,329 U.S.394 (1947) (no estop-
pelby express stipulation although price-fixing provision inserted at licensee's insistence); Mac-
Gregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 405 n. 3 (1947) (footnote-dictum
that even if unexecuted, agreements would be illegal). This would appear to assume that no
more than the fact of agreement need be proved to establish illegality, although the presence of
patents is "primafacie evidence of control." Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337
U.S. 293, 307 (1949).
134 See part I supra.
115 See note 62 supra.
116 "If petitioner and others were guilty of infractions of the antitrust laws, they could be
held responsible in appropriate proceedings brought against them by the Government or by
injured private persons." Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951).
137This position is clearly contrary to earlier decisions allowing proof of benevolent purpose
to negative any illegality in price-fixing among parties without power to affect the market.
Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 237 (1918) (breaking up monopoly
in that branch of the grain trade); Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163
(1931) (to reconcile conflicting patent claims); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288
U.S. 344 (1933) (to reduce "distress" coal, "pyramiding," and "cross-hauling" in a demoralized
industry); and see Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (bona fide wage dispute).
238 "For such agreements, no less than thosd to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of
traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment."
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951). If the existence of re-
straints on individual traders' freedom is to determine the existence of restraints of trade, the
absurd result is reached that all commercial contracts are illegal. Presumably "sell" refers to
selling to persons not privy to the agreements. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v.
United States, 193 F. 2d 907 (1951). But even this less literal construction of Justice Black's
words reveals that the definition of "price-fixing" within the per se rule has radically expanded
since the Board of Trade-Standard Oil (Indiana)-Appalachian Coals line of cases, which is be-
yond doubt completely rejected now. See text and notes at notes 102-12 supra. Should re-
straint on individual freedom in selling to others be considered a criterion for "restraints of
trade" other than price-fixing, obviously the per se category has been considerably extend-
ed, although perhaps not beyond its existing bounds. See note 166 infra.
119 An unsympathetic court would have no difficulty so limiting it. Broad language conso-
nant with a literal per se rule appeared in the resale price maintenance cases both before and
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of prior law. Not only is its result encompassed within the broader interpreta-
tion of the Dr. Miles case; 40 but the entire body of resale price maintenance
precedent is, under one analysis, reconcilable with a power interpretation of the
per se rule. Historically, and probably as a matter of economic necessity, resale
price maintenance cases have involved only branded, trademarked, copyrighted,
or patented products.' 4' If consumers treat these distinctively "labeled" prod-
ucts as unique, i.e., economically distinguishable from physically identical or
easily substitutable commodities, a producer's exclusive control of their produc-
tion may represent an economically significant form of monopoly power. Resale
price maintenance is itself directed toward procuring the partial monopoly
which distributors can create by reducing the sensitivity of consumers' reactions
to fluctuations in the prices of substitutable (and even physically identical) com-
modities.'4 By maintaining whoesale and retail profit margins, a price-maintain-
ing producer may gain the services of distributors capable of altering the de-
mand for his brand by their peculiar influence on consumer tastes and atti-
tudes.' Monopolies which are the result of consumer irrationality are nonethe-
less monopolies;'" and the power over the "separate market" for his branded
product which a producer obtains by resale price-fixing should be sufficient to
qualify as illegal under the "substantial control" test of Trenton Potteries or the
"market effect" test posited in the Socony-Vacuum text.
The "separate market" theory of resale price-fixing illegality, however, has
no application to maximum resale price-fixing which, as indicated above, 45 may
represent an attempted return to the very price competition which minimum
and absolute resale price maintenance tends to destroy. Nor has there been ex-
press judicial recognition of the "separate market" theory even in cases the
after the Board of Trade case had imposed quite different standards in the direct price-fixing
field. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing
Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (distinguishable as a construction of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 [1914], 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 [1951]). United States v. Univis Lens
Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942), and United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707
(1944), are recent minimum resale price-fixing cases employing similarly broad language under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
140 See text at notes 76-81 supra.
141 The Miller-Tydings Act exempts only resale price-fixing involving "a commodity which
bears.. . the trade mark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor of such commodity."
50 Stat. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1951).
14 See the general discussion of cross-elasticity of demand and differentiated products in
Stigler, The Theory of Price 88-90, 229-232 (1946).
143 As one commentator puts it: "By setting a high enough retail price, the manufacturer
can assure the dealers who 'advertise' his product a satisfactory profit by eliminating price
competition from the 'free riding' low-cost retailers." Resale Price Maintenance and the
Anti-Trust Laws, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 368, 377 (1951).
4 Cf. Indiana Farmer's Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293 U.S. 268, 279
(1934); and United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D.C. Minn., 1945).
141 See text at notes 39-41 supra. Certainly it would not be employed to obtain distributor
good-will.
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facts of which appear to provide excellent examples of its practical operation.14
Finally, it is extremely doubtful that Kiefer-Stewart, or the trend of which it is
representative, will be confined to resale price-fixing. Not only is the reasoning
of the Supreme Court opinion, i.e., maximum resale price-fixing is illegal because
it restrains traders' freedom,147 applicable to all other forms of price-fixing; but
the sole authority cited for the price-fixing point was United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., a direct price affectation case. Hence, in seeking the rationale
underlying Kiefer-Stewart v. Seagram, it would seem wiser to interpret it broadly
as striking down all express price-fixing agreements regardless of purpose, pow-
er, or effect.
IV
The justification for so sweeping a prohibition as the per se rule literally inter-
preted is not readily apparent. In its original form the rule was probably intend-
ed to be no more than a shorthand statement of the logic which made it unnec-
essary for the government to prove that the prices actually fixed were unreason-
able. 148 It having been determined that only contracts, combinations or con-
spiracies in unreasonable restraint of trade were violative of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act,149 a logical leap could easily be made from the economic rationale
of the Act itself to a holding that agreements shown to have affected market
prices were unreasonable without further proof.1 0 Market price must be free of
conscious manipulation if it is to perform its function in a competitive economy
as sensitive indicator of individual values freely expressed and automatically
reconciled. To impair the automatic functioning of this "central nervous system
of our economy" '' is necessarily to restrain competition unreasonably, for to do
so deprives the economy directly of that proper allocation of goods and re-
sources which is the major social benefit of unfettered competition. But this
rationale for the per se rule would be completely consonant with the Board of
Trade case which requires the government to prove that price-fixing agreements
have actually affected market prices.
146 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942), and United States v. Bausch &
Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944). This peculiar feature of resale price maintenance has
not gone unrecognized by the courts, however. One early court, in holding illegal the resale
price maintenance scheme of a secret-formula-medicine manufacturer, found that "their
prime purpose is neither protection of the retained business of the complainant nor of the
wholesaler, but only to prevent competition among retailers." Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman,
153 Fed. 24, 25 (C.A. 6th, 1907), where the court also expresses serious doubt that the pro-
ducer receives any direct benefit from resale price-fixing. See similar language in Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408-409 (1911); and FTC v. Beech-Nut Pack-
ing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 445 (1922).
'47Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951).
148 See note 100 supra.
119 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
180 E.g., United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
5 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n. 59 (1940).
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In this perspective the lighter burden imposed by the Trenton Potteries "sub-
stantial control" test appears as a judicial concession to the difficulty of tracing
causal relationships in the complex reactions of a functioning economy. It simply
states that an actual effect on market prices is reasonably and legally inferable
from proof that the parties agreeing on prices among themselves have power to
affect market prices. Rounding out this doctrine, the reasoning of the Socony-
Vacuum textml permits an inference of cause (price-fixing by parties with market
power) from effect (abnormal price rise or stability) or effect (price affectation)
from cause (price-fixing by parties with market power) where the government
can sustain a reasonable burden of proof as to the probability of some causal
connection. As a matter of economic policy, however, price-fixing agreements
among parties incapable of affecting market prices would seem innocuous; and
hence it is probably necessary to look beyond that policy to understand the
broader prohibitions embodied in the literal per se rule of footnote 59 and Kiefer-
Stewart v. Seagram.
The peculiar characteristics of resale price-fixing which may account for the
early appearance of literal per se language in the price maintenance cases may
also serve as a guide to the underlying rationale of that doctrine. The only ap-
parent explanations for minimum and absolute resale price-fixing as economic
phenomena are in terms of purposes and activities which contravene the eco-
nomic policy underlying the Sherman Act. Resale price-fixing may serve as a
"signal-calling" device for oligopolistic producers," 3 as a method of inducing re-
strictive combinations of distributors to favor certain brands as against others
or at least treat them equally, 5 4 or as a means of obtaining an economically sig-
nificant monopoly in the market for a specified brand through distributor influ-
ence on consumers.' In other words, from the standpoint of the antitrust laws
nothing good may be said about the purposes for minimum and absolute resale
price-fixing whether successful or not.
Of comparable significance is the practical impossibility in most cases of dem-
onstrating that price maintenance activities have resulted in actual harm to the
economy or even that the market power of the parties has made such injury
highly probable. The growth of the concept "conscious parallelism" as a substi-
tute for proof of express agreement is an example of judicial recognition of these
152 Ibid., at 223-24 (1940).
15' Minimum and absolute resale price-fixing provide a smoothly functioning means of
keeping tab on competing prices without resorting to trade association tactics. Similarly
these devices can provide an effective method of keeping fellow oligopolists in line. Once a
major producer succumbs to pressure for price maintenance others must follow suit or lose
distributor good-will. "Although competing manufacturers cannot lawfully agree with each
other respecting prices, they can accomplish the same result through resale price maintenance
by making identical resale price agreements." FTC, op. cit. supra note 47, at LXII.
154 E.g., United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
165 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1941). It is quite likely that
all three motives are operative in varying degrees wherever resale price maintenance is an
industry-wide practice.
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evidential difficulties in the "signal calling" situation. 5 ' In its "separate market"
aspect as well, resale price maintenance, being essentially an advertising phe-
nomenon likely to prove successful only where the consuming market displays
highly irrational tendencies, raises nearly insurmountable evidential obstacles.
The inscrutable nature of brand name appeal and distributor market influence
make it extremely difficult to discover and prove the relative market position of
the parties by means of the statistics ordinarily available to a prosecutor. 157
Two characteristics, then-the unlikelihood of lawful purpose or results58
and the tremendous evidential burden which proof of power of effect would en-
tail-appear both to account for and to justify the application of a literal rule
of per se illegality to minimum and absolute resale price-fixing. An extension of
this rule to the relatively rare case of maximunm resale price-fixing is certainly
not intolerable. Although, besides a number of unlawful or economically unde-
sirable purposes,19 a maximum resale price-fixer could be seeking to overcome
the restraints imposed by illegal combinations of distributors for the desirable
purpose of indulging in price competition, adequate enforcement of the antitrust
laws against such combinations would obviate the necessity for this device. It
would seem anomalous, therefore, to reduce the effectiveness of a rule designed
to facilitate enforcement of the antitrust laws by creating a confusing exception
intended to remedy a defect which arises only because the antitrust laws are not
adequately enforced. This argument becomes especially cogent where the crea-
tion of such an exception is likely to remove whatever motivation presently
exists for private antitrust enforcement against horizontal combinations of
distributors.
Nor are the reasons for a literal rule of per se illegality confined to resale price
maintenance. Although the evidential burden may not be as great where other
express price-fixing arrangements are involved, the paucity of lawful purposes
or results would appear fairly comparable. It is difficult, if not impossible, to
imagine a purpose for direct price-fixing among competitors which is not viola-
tive of the spirit of the Sherman Act; and hence it is unlikely that a literal per se
rule would ensnare "innocents." From an economist's standpoint, price-fixing
agreements among competitors incapable of affecting market prices are not only
innocuous but probably also unexplainable in terms of rational economic mo-
tives. Indeed, economists might.argue that such agreements do not exist except
where the parties are mistaken as to their power. From the standpoint of one
attempting to enforce a set of economic regulations, however, such agreements
may exist in the very significant sense that the rigid rules of evidence and limit-
ed presumptions make proof of power sometimes impractical or impossible The
15, Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); United States v. Masonite
Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
1657 Authorities cited note 63 supra.
I5s "The case where a distributor fixes admission prices to be charged by a single inde-
pendent exhibitor, no other licensees or exhibitors being in contemplation, seems to be wholly
academic." United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 144 (1948).
150 See text at notes 55-60 supra.
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existence of a price-fixing agreement or conspiracy is ordinarily susceptible to a
more certain and less intricate proof than either market power or market effect
even where these factors are present. The judicial system is much better suited
(or, at least, accustomed) to coping with such facts than with the industry
studies, market statistics, and economic premises necessary in demonstrating
market power or effect.160 Even when market power and effect are not present,
there is nevertheless ordinarily a need for prophylaxis if the probability of law-
ful purpose is as small as supposed above.
Certainly if proof of the agreement alone is sufficient to sustain a price-fixing
indictment, the Antitrust Division has at least one more crutch with which to
overcome the many practical handicaps of litigating against large corporations
with a detailed knowledge of their private affairs never available to the govern-
ment.'61 Nor does a literal per se rule work solely in the government's favor. Its
lighter, less expensive burden of proof favors self-interested private enforcement
such as was had in the Kiefer-Stewart case; and, at the same time, its very sim-
plicity and calculability should enable potential defendants to avoid violations
of the Act.
If the policies embodied in the Sherman Act are worth effectuating, they de-
serve rigid enforcement even at the expense of perfect justice. As Justice Peck-
ham warned in exhorting against the rule of reason, should the evidential burden
of the plaintiff become too great in antitrust litigation, enforcement must be
relegated to the unreliable commercial conscience. 162 When our legal system
proves unequal to the task of maintaining competition, the body politic has and
will again turn to administrative regulation of monopoly and thence to monopo-
lizing on its own.' These consequences are as antithetical to the political and
economic ideals which the Sherman Act embodies as is the existence of private
monopoly. 4
160 Classic examples of important antitrust suits made to turn on legalistic verbalisms
wholly irrelevant to the economic consequences of the practices involved are such cases as
United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); and United States v. Richfield
Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Calif., 1951), whose results depended solely upon the existence
or nonexistence of an agency relationship.
n Authorities cited note 63 supra. Despite these difficulties it is, perhaps, significant to
note that the Government has not yet chosen to rely on the relaxed evidential standards of
footnote 59 in prosecuting its price-fixing charges. E.g., cases cited note 129 supra.
162 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 331-32 (1897).
162 "Courts are ill-equipped to apply a rule which is more economic than legal in nature and
which necessitates the minute examination of many subtle factors. An erroneous determination
by the Court, exculpating incipient monopolies, will have dangerous social consequences. The
inadequate and sporadic nature of judicial control might eventually make more thorough-
going governmental supervision necessary. No suppression of competition, however minute,
could long continue without such regulation. To supervise and regulate the multitudinous
arrangements that would be made were the dictum of the 4ppalachian Case to become the
established rule would impose an administrative burden upon government which could only
be justified by indubitably clear social and economic gains." Handler, Construction and En-
forcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws 34-35 (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941).
164 
"If the so-called competitive abuses were to be appraised here, the reasonableness of
prices would necessarily become an issue in every price-fixing case. In that event the Sherman
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But it should be remembered that the per se rule is designed essentially to
reduce the evidential burden in antitrust prosecution, not to enlarge the purview
of substantive law. Totally unleashed, it could engulf in illegality every business
contract stipulating prices and involving interstate commerce."' It should be
confined to cases where the likelihood of unlawful purpose or result is as great
as in the case of direct price-fixing among competitors."'5 Where market effect
or power to produce one has not been proved, the defendant should be per-
mitted to justify his action with evidence of lawful purpose unless the probabili-
ty of such purpose is too small to be worth the difficulties inherent in proving its
existence or nonexistence.
Roughing out the categories of acts where a literal rule of per se illegality
should be applicable is, of course, a case-by-case process; but if case analysis
proceeds explicitly in terms of a criterion comparable to probability of lawful
purpose, the course of decisions should not be difficult to predict. In as complex
a situation as the Socony-Vacuum buying program, for example, if no power or
effect were shown, little could be lost by making the presumption of unlawful
purpose prima facie only, while much might be gained by giving entrepreneurs
maximum freedom in choosing their methods of competition. As Justice Jackson
has said: "If the courts are to apply the lash of the antitrust laws to the backs
of businessmen to make them compete, we cannot in fairness also apply the
lash whenever they hit upon a successful method of competing."6 7
Act would soon be emasculated; its philosophy would be supplanted by one which is wholly
alien to a system of free competition; it would not be the charter of freedom which its framers
intended." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
165 See note 138 supra.
166 A remarkable parallel to the evolution of the price-fixing rule may be traced in the "fore-
stalling" cases which involve agreements for exclusive dealing, boycotts, and patent tie-ins of
unpatented materials. Such agreements may no longer be justified as directed against illegal
activities of the foreclosed groups, Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S.
457 (1941); American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F. 2d 233 (App.D.C., 1942); and
after a series of cases apparently requiring proof of market power (domination) to meet the
requirements of Section 3 of the Clayton Act and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Standard
Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922); Pearsall Butter Co. v. FTC, 292
F. 720 (C.A. 7th, 1923); FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920), the Court has finally concluded
that "it is unreasonable, Per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market" and
that a market is "substantial" if the "volume of business affected... cannot be said to be
insignificant or insubstantial." International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396
(1947). Justice Frankfurter candidly admits in Standard Oil of California v. United States,
337 U.S. 293 (1949), that a rule of per se illegality rather than a rule testing the economic con-
sequences of such arrangements was adopted because "tying agreements serve hardly any
purpose beyond suppression of competition" (305) and the latter rule would require "a
standard of proof, if not virtually impossible to meet, at least most ill-suited for ascertain-
ment by courts." Ibid., at 310. Although explicitly confined to the Clayton Act in the Standard
of California opinion (ibid., at 311-13), this reasoning is certainly applicable to violations
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F.Supp. 280, 286,
296-97 (S.D.Calif., 1951).
167 Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 324 (1949).
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